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CASE COMMENTS
the company, makes commitments within the actual or apparent
scope of his authority. Bond v. National Fire Ins. Co., 77 W. Va.
736, 88 S.E. 389 (1916). This is true whether the company actually
knows of the adjuster's acts or not, and through him conditions
in the policy may be waived, including the right to subrogation.
Everett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 129 Neb. 386, 261 N.W. 575
(1935); Weber v. United Mutuals Co., 75 N.D. 581, 31 N.W.2d 456
(1948); Powers v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 216 S.C. 309, 57 S.E.2d 638
(1950).
The principal case is of interest primarily because it settles,
in this jurisdiction, a question heretofore unadjudicated. The
soundness of the decision is unquestionable as evidenced by the
cases discussed above. The case will serve as a convenient starting
point on questions of subrogation involving tort liability, decisions
on which, as the court noted, are lacking in West Virginia.
R. H. R.
LABOR LAw-AMBULATORY EMPLOYER-PICKETING.-SUit by a
sign painting corporation to enjoin peaceful picketing by a union
in front of a service station at which employees of the corporation
were painting a sign. The picketing climaxed a long struggle to
unionize the corporation's employees. Previously, picketing had
been done at the company's premises. The placard carried by the
single picket stated that the men working on the sign were not
members of the local sign painters' union. Picketing occurred
both while the men were working and after they had left. While
the picketing continued, the service station did no business. Held,
reversing the lower court, that the injunction should not have
been issued, since this was peaceful primary picketing protected
by the free speech provision of the Federal Constitution. Ohio
Valley Advertising Corp. v. Union Local 207, 76 S.E.2d 113 (W. Va.
1953).
The legality of peaceful picketing, in the absence of a strike,
was doubted before the decision in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940). That case established that peaceful picketing is pro-
tected under the Fourteenth Amendment, but can be enjoined
where a clear and present danger of substantive evil exists. It was
said that that states might "set the limits of permissible contest
open to industrial combatants" subject only to the constitutional
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restriction. The question left unanswered was whether the clear
and present danger proviso was the sole basis for state regulation.
Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court, recognizing that
picketing is something in addition to free speech, have said that
the states are far from impotent in defining proper purposes and
locations of picketing in accord with the state's public policy.
Local No. 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers & Steamfitters
v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953) (picketing amounted to illegal
coercion of employer to discharge his nonunion employees); Build-
ing Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532
(1950) (coercion of employer to impose union on employees);
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470
(1950) (picketing of a self-employed person); Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (picketing encouraged
illegal restraint of trade); Carpenters & Joiners Union of America,
Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) (picketing of one
industrially unconnected with dispute violated state's anti-trust
law).
In each of these cases picketing per se was not prohibited, but
only that which had as its purpose the contravention of some
rule of public policy either legislatively or judicially declared.
Furthermore, public policy has varied from state to state, e.g., not
all states have found picketing of a self-employed person objec-
tionable, Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937),
nor of one remotely connected with the dispute. Galler v. Slurzberg,
22 N.J. Super. 477, 92 A.2d 89 (1952) (ultimate consumer of
primary employer's product; dictum).
In Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1951), federal
policy with respect to restricting picketing has been declared, and
the decisions applying and interpreting this section have similarly
upheld the policy when the defense of infringing upon free speech
was used or available. See NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction
Trades Council, 314 U.S. 675 (1951). Under the act secondary
picketing has been made an unfair labor practice except under
certain circumstances. In the common-situs cases the picketing to
persuade the nonunion employees to the union's side was held to
be primary activity, although the incidental effect was a strike by
the secondary employer's workers. United Electrical, Radio, &-
Machine Workers (Ryan Construction Corp.), 85 NLRB 417 (1949).
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Picketing of an ambulatory employer, that is, one whose work-
ers provide services on the premises of another employer, has
recently been sanctioned in NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs,
191 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1951). Such picketing was said not to be an
unfair labor practice under Section 8 (b) (4) (A) if "(a) The picket-
ing is strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute is located
on the secondary employer's premises; (b) at the time of the
picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business
at the situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close
to the location of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly
that the dispute is with the primary employer." Id. at 68.
The court in the principal case stated that these requirements
had been met. Bakery 8 Pastry Drivers &c Helpers v. Wohl, 315 U.S.
769 (1942) was cited as being in point. That case stands for the
proposition that picketing may be protected when the subject
matter of the dispute is followed. In the Wohl case picketing was
threatened of the bakery products of the primary employer on sale
in certain retail stores. In the principal case apparently the sign,
the product of the primary employer, was picketed after the workers
had left. However, the service station was an ultimate consumer of
the product.
In the absence of controlling federal legislation, the New York
decisions apply the unity of interest concept, implicit in the Wohl
case, that allows picketing of the retailer, because he is deemed
a party to the labor dispute. Nevertheless, the cases have refused
to extend the concept to permit picketing of the ultimate con-
sumer of the primary employer's product, Weil &c Co. v. Doe, 168
Misc. 211, 5 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1938), or to allow general picketing
of the retailer, Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910
(1938). The case of Enterprise Window Cleaning Co. v. Slowuta,
273 App. Div. 662, 79 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1st Dept. 1948), refused to
allow picketing of ambulatory workers who washed windows on the
premises of a secondary employer. The court, however, did not con-
sider the permissibility of picketing the workers because it was
searching for some tangible product of the work which could be
properly picketed. Not finding any, picketing was enjoined. Perhaps,
at the present time the New York courts might be persuaded by the
Service Trade Chauffeurs case, supra, to allow picketing of the
ambulatory workers.
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The restrictions against picketing the ultimate consumer and
picketing the retailer in order to encourage the public to withdraw
totally its patronage from him seem reasonable. The policy
behind them is the same declared by the Texas court in the
Ritter's Cafe case, supra, viz., that the picketing should be confined
to those industrially related to the primary employer and un-
mistakably show that the dispute is with the latter. The public
interest in the free flow of commerce is at stake. It will be remem-
bered that a prime requirement in the ambulatory employer
picketing cases is also that the placards show with whom the real
dispute is.
In summary, the criterion is not so much can the secondary
employer do something which will influence the primary employer
favorably for the union, as will the court allow picketing to occur
before the secondary employer's premises when he is relatively
remote from the dispute, although not a neutral of purest ray.
Perhaps in the principal case picketing of the service station which
dealt only briefly and occasionally with the primary employer
should not have been tolerated while the men working on the
sign were absent. Two recent cases are indicative of a trend to
forbid product picketing altogether. Way Baking Co. v. Teamsters
& Truck Drivers Local No. 164, 335 Mich. 478, 56 N.W.2d 357
(1953); Capital Service v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 848 (1953).
R. L. D.
LABOR LAW - COLLECTiVE BARGAINING - RENT ON COMPANY-
OWNED HousEs.-Employer announced a rent increase on all of
its dwellings leased to employees. Employees protested this uni-
lateral action, deeming it to be a "pay cut", and stated that the
matter of house rent must be taken up with the union as a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The NLRB in Lehigh
Portland Cement Co., 101 NLRB No. 110 (Nov. 24, 1952), upheld
employees' contention. [Apparently, in Bemis Bro. Bag Co., 96
NLRB 728 (1951), the Board opined rent to be ipso facto a man-
datory subject of collective bargaining.] Held, on review, that
the employer must bargain collectively on the proposed rent in-
crease by virtue of §§ 8 (d), 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946), as amended by
Labor Management Relations Act 1947, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29
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